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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

HALF FOR THE BETTER HALF - THE PENNSYLVANIA
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW*
By James H. Booser*
Introduction
Millions of partnerships crystallized legally on September 1, 1947, in Pennsylvania, but not one of them had a cent of partnership property. The partners

in each case were man and wife. Their conjugal partnership property or community property was nonexistent and will be limited to marital gains of income
and property acquired as the legally presumed result of the labor or management
of man or wife on or after September 1. A great industrial commonwealth,
through its legislature, had determined to reduce to practice, by a slow evolutionary
process while it lasts, what its own supreme court in a prior decade had occasion

to cll "the Spanish theory of community property."' What happened in Pennsylvania on September 1 did not alter the title to a single property. What the husband owned remained his, what the wife owned, remained her separate estate (for
which Pennsylvania had provided since 1848), and tenancies by the entirety or
joint property remained such. So Pennsylvania started out with no community property as the sun smiled down on Labor Day on the millions of wives who had become community partners overnight.
Beginning September 1, 1947, the effective date of the Pennsylvania Community Property Law of July 7, 1947,2 a new class of community property, or
*As this article went to press, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the Pennsylvania Community Property Act unconstitutional.
**Swarthmore College, 1931, A.B. degree; Harvard Law School, 1935, LL.B.; member of
Dauphin County and Pennsylvania Bars.
'MALLORY'S ESTATE, 300 Pa. 217, 221 (1930). The fundamental theory received early
recognition in Texas, whose law now becomes of the greatest importance for Pennsylvania; Chief
Justice Hemphill authoritatively held, in CARTWRIGHT v. HOLLIS, 5 Tex. 152, 163 (1849)
that "the Spanish system of jurisprudence . .. regarded the matrimonial union, so far as property
was concerned, as a species of partnership . . . in which each partner might have separate
estates, or property. as well as a common stock of acquisitions and gains." The Blackstone of
Spain, Don Sancho de Llamas y Molina, who began his weighty commentaries about 1776 (as 2
de Funiak, Principles of Community Property (1943) 406-407 translates No. 37 to Nov. Rec. Law
8) thus expounded the basic theory of a partnership limited to marital gains by onerous title:
. it is not a universal partnership because it does not comprise the present property or all of
the future property, but only that which is acquired by work, industry or negotiation, which is
the property acquired during marriage which civil law says proceeds ex questu, without including
that which is acquired by lucrative title, such as a legacy, inheritance or donation; ...in con.sequence the partnership contracted in marriage is guneral, covering all the property acquired by
industry or negotiation ...as ...Matienzo declares . . "
248 P.S. secs. 201-215. The effect of the act as to income from separate property and its
constitutionality is before the Supreme CoAut of Pennsylvania, on original jurisdiction, in WILCOX v. PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, argued on November 10. As
will be seen in connection with section nine, fair written contracts before marriage, before
September I or at any time may modify results the act would otherwise effect.
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connubial partnership property, in marital gains of property and income of man
or wife, slowly started to grow, showing its first slight shoots of green in the money
the men hand over to their wives, as men do in Pennsylvania on payday. Though
they do nothing except be married, this partnership of man and wife in future
marital gains attaches, by operation of law, as an incident of the marriage relation. 8 When the act applies, as it most plainly will apply for spouses domiciled in
Pennsylvania to their future property and income in Pennsylvania,' then income
and new property or acquests and gains of either spouse are legally (without so
much as a gift in the dead of night) acquired half by him and half by her, much
as earnings by an unemancipated minor are wholly, and not just half, the earnings
of the parent. Although the act's immediate application is chiefly to income, and
it gets results, income taxwise, the act in itself is purely a property law which
would in time cut across the whole path of life in Pennsylvania. 5 Pennsylvania
thus became the twelfth state with an effective community property law.9 The
handling of community property, as it grows in importance, may be guided most
3CONNOR v. ELLIOTT, 18 Howard 591, 593 (1855); FERNANDEZ v. WIENER. 326
U.S. 340, 66 S. Ct. 178, 182 (1945).
4The Pennsylvania Community Property Law applies, inter alia, in the absence of modification
by effective contract, to personal property acquired anywhere henceforth by husband or wife while
he, if not necessarily she, is domiciled in a Pennsylvania home; to real estate hereafter acquired
in Pennsylvania by anyone, but not to anyone's income from non-community, noncommunity
state real estate; and to most income, including most income from future trusts, of a spouse for
whom Pennsylvania is legally "home:" COMMISSIONER v. SKAGGS, 122 F. (2d) 721 (C.C.A.
5th 1941); BLACK v. COMMISSIONER, 114 F. (2d) 355 (C.C.A. 9th 1940). SKILKRET v.
HELVERING, 138 F. (2d) 925 Ct. App. D.C. 1943) is one of many cases defining "home,"
community-property wise. Cp. Goodrich and Coleman, Pennsylvania Marital Communities and
Common Law Neighbors, 96 U. of P. L.R. (Nov. 1947). 1-19. The act applies to income from
property to which it applies. Robert A. Leflar in 21 Calif. L.R. 221-238 (1933), more briefly
than Beale, whom everyone must know, presents an excellent exposition of "Community
Property and Conflict of Laws."
'Precisely because it is a property law, the act has an incidental contemporary influence upon
the interpretation of the little word "of" of the phrase "net income of every individual" in what
is now section 11 of the Internal Revenue Code: HOPKINS v. BACON, 282 U.S. 122 (1930);
COMMISSIONER v. HARMON, 323 U.S. 44 (1944). Conversely, tax cases settle (sometimes
tax-wise, suggests Cahn, Federal Taxation and Private Law, 44 Col. L.R. 669. 674-677) a lot
of property law and the value of the convenient tax services is increasingly recognized for general
practice under the act.
'Community property statutes appeared in Louisiana in 1808 and 1825, Texas, 1840 and
1848, California, 1850, New Mexico (simply continuing Spanish law), 1851, Arizona, 1865,
Nevada, 1865, Idaho, 1866, Washington, 1869, Oklahoma (after an elective act in 1939), 1945,
and in 1947 in Michigan, Oregon (which has had an elective act), Nebraska, and Pennsylvania.
The Nebraska law became effective September 7, 1947. Spanish law pre-existed in perhaps the
first six states, in Louisiana from 1769% in Texas "as far back as any historical record exists,"
ROMPEL v. U.S., 59 F. Supp. 483, 486 (1945), in California "from the time of Father Serra,"
ROBBINS v. U.S., 5 F. (2d)'690, 695 (1925), and was simply continued in New Mexico where
a 1907 code finally adopted the then statutory law of California. Arizona, divided from New
Mexico in 1863, may have had the common law a year, STILES v. LORD, 2 Ariz. 154 (1886),
Nevada a bit longer perhaps, DARRENBERGER v. HAUPT, 10 Nev. 43, 46 (1875), but the
authorities argue their Spanish inheritance, too. Neighboring states-contemporaneously with
Married Women's Property Acts in Pennsylvania and elsewhere-adopted the early California
legislation, with a separate estate for married women incidental to the community property system:
Kirkwood, Historical Background and Objectives of the Law of Community Property in the
Pacific Coast States, 11 Washington L. R. 1, 11 (1936).
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materially by prior experience and precedent in Oklahoma and Texas, and to a
minor extent New Mexico and Washington, the states from which conservative
Pennsylvania derived its seasoned statutory provisions. 7 The act is packed into
sixteen short sections which will be considered in numerical -order.8 Take now
your copy of the act and turn to sections one and two.
Sections one and two
SEPARATE OR NON-COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The first concern of the legislature was to preserve the old, familiar keystone property and to define separate property by identical provisions for husband
and wife in sections one and two. All other property acquired by husband or
wife is under section three community property, so the first two sections are of
7

The act duplicates the Oklahoma Community Property Act of April 22, 1945, Okla. Sess.
Laws 1945, p. 116, 32 Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) sec. 66, et seq., aside from minor adaptations to
Pennsylvania courts and procedure and aside from section five principally requiring for a wife's
deed her husband's joinder. In the main, via Oklahoma, it is Texas law. Even section 15
generalizes early Texas decisions; sections 11-14 are from New Mexico's expansion of basic Texan
recognition of an abandoned wife as substituted managing partner; and from Texan liability for
his separate debts and experiments with some control for the wife was built sectien 7 with [in
intrusion as to tort liability from a part of Washington's, if not Louisiana's, case law. But
section 10 removes Texan property penalties for marital wrong from divorce proceedings and
section 9 is emphatically not Texan law excluding post-nuptial contracts but derives (even to the
baffling creditor's "equity") from Washington's Act of Feb. 2, 1888, P.L. 52, Rem. Rev. Stat. (1933)
sec. 10572. The very verbiage of the title to our act appears in the title in Oklahoma.
BIn lieu of voluminous notations of supporting authorities, general reference is made to 11
Am. Jur. (1937) introducing helpful annotations;
Ballinger, Property Rights of Husband and Wife, under the Community or Ganancial System
(1895) ;
Burby, Cases on Community Property (2d ed. 1946);
Burby, Law Refresher, 463-487 (1946);
Cal. Jur., 1930 Supplement, comprehensive new treatment of Community Property by Dean
McMurray; Collins, Community Property and Taxes (1945);
472 C.C.H. Standard Federal Tax Reports, e.g. para. 455;
41 and 42 C.J.S. (1944) and 31 C. J. (1923); Daggett, The Community Property System of
Louisiana (1945 reprint);
Eagir, Community Property Law in Oklahoma (1940);
de Funiak, Principles of Community Property (1943);
Loeb, The Legal Property Relations of Married Persons, A Study in Comparative Legislation.
13 Columbia Studies in History, Economics and Public Law (1900);
Lowry and Robert, The Oregon Community Property Law (July, 1947)
McKay. Community Property (2d ed. 1925);
3 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation (1942);
Prentice-Hall, Federal Tax Service, also Trust Service, para. 1016;
Speer, Law of Marital Rights in Texas (3d ed. 1929) ;
23 Tex. Jur. (1932), treatment by Judge Speer, texts on real property such as Thompson
Eind
Tiffany;
3 Vernier, American' Family Laws (1935), the relevant digests (title Husband and Wife)
and annotated statutes, particularly of Texas, and the treasures in the law reviews, and bar association journals;
Dauphin County Reporter, advance sheets, fall of 194"0, reprints a series of articles from the
Oklahoma Bar Association Journal for 1945 and 1946. See Beardsley, Bibliography of Selected
Materials relating to the Law of Community Property, 14 Washington L. R. 126-136 (1939),
and the latest references in Powell, The Community Property Law of Pennsylvania (1947).
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the utmost importance in defining negatively, as the act does not otherwise define,
community property. These two sections cover a vast territory and are in the main
copiously clarified by pertinent Texas decisions.9
First, all property in Pennsylvania on September 1, 1947, stays put. A kind
of "grandfather clause," without reflecting on marital ages, preserves the status
quo, and the act is wholly prospective. Under the name generally of separate
property, emphatically not community property, is classed the great mass of antecommunity property. Initially classed as separate property is all property which
before September 1, 1947, or a later wedding day was owned by the husband or by
the wife, or was claimed by either under contract, under some right to acquire
ownership or under a valid cause of action therefor. 10
Also expressly suggested as separate property, even when acquired after the
act's effective date or a later marriage, is property acquired by gift, devise or descent. Joint gifts, as in Texas," are here included, as non-community property on
their face. Thus excepted from the community property regime, these modes of
acquisition, by lucrative title as the Spaniards would have it, take in property not
acquired by the Spanish onerous title; that is, all property not acquired as the
presumed result of the labor or management of either spouse is not community.
Therefore, bequests, inheritances or any property otherwise received by way of
pure non-remunerative gift, are separate property; but pensions by way of deferred
compensation are not such gifts. 12 When the principal of property is thus acquired, as in most trusts and spendthrift trusts where principal is given, only
impliedly given in many instances to make the distinction more difficult, then the
income somehow springs from the principal and not directly enough from the
gift or bequest to be separate under this particular proviso. 18 On the theory of gift,
although some premium payments may have a community source, proceeds of in915 Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stats. Ann. (1940), Articles 4613 and 4614, pages J90 and 500.

The variant phrase 'increase of all lands," inapplicable in any event to personalty, was disregarded
for a century, 23 Tex. Jur. 77.78, and was eliminated in the 1945 model' Oklahoma act.
10SAUVAGE v. WAUHOP, 143 S.W. 259, 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), incomplete pure
adverse possession excluded; HAND v. ERRINGTONR 233 S.W. 567, 571 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921), oral contract to purchase land included.
1iBRADLEY v. LOVE, 60 Tex. 472, 477-8 (1883).
I 2BERG :v. BERG, 115 S.W. (2d) 1171. 1172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) ; CHENEY v. SAN
FRANCISCO EMPLOYEE'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 61 P. (2d) 754, 756 (1936).
18PORTER v. COMMISSIONER, 2 T.C. 1244, 1245 (1943), affirmed, sub noma.COMMISSIONER v. PORTER, 148 F. (2d) 566 (C.C.A. 5th 1945). This issue, along with the
constitutional status of income from separate property, is presented as to "net income," including
a $400,000 dividend, for the surviving wife from trusts of over $19,000,000 created prior to 1940,
in the case of HARRIS TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK v. BURLINGAME, No. 33,122, now
pending before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma on an appeal by the trustee from a favorable
decision on its bill for instructions, where the District Court on December 3, 1946, held that,
although the surviving wife had remarried, and the English type of spendthrift trust provided her
right should be forefeited if any part of the income should "pass to or for the benefit of, any
other person than such beneficiary," the Community Property Law did not bring into operation

such a forfeiture.
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surance on the husband's life payable to the wife become her separate property;
hence community property complications of insurance are minimized for many.' 4
Third, the final expressed class of separate property is that received as compensation for personal injuries. Sections one and two rectify faulty logic in most community property states which had no such express provision and, Nevada excepted,
over-hastily concluded that what was not a gift must be community. Therefore, notwithstanding negligence of the husband contributing to the wife's injury, she can
recover from a third party tort-feasor in Pennsylvania as heretofore.' 5 Such compensation not being separate until received, this provision does not hide a joker
circumventing established prohibition of inter-spousal tort suits.'6 Also, since
the substantive compensation for a wife's injuries is not defined, the husband's
cause of action therefor is not destroyed by implication, although under Pennsylvania procedure both spouses must join in one suit. 17 Personal injuries are
broad enough to include libel and slander.' 8 As in Louisiana, workmen's compensation proceedings are unaffected by community property law, our act more
broadly defining as non-community all moneys received as compensation for personal injuries. 19
Fourth, there is more separate property than immediately catches the eye in
the act. Section three is not a perfect residuary clause, being to some extent limited
to property "acquired" by onerous title by "either" spouse and to marital acquests
and gains.
When separate property in one of the above categories is sold and the proceeds are re-invested, the new property is not a gain "acquired" by marital industry
but is a mere change of form or mutation of separate property. As a matter of
basic history without need for any more specific statutory provision, separate
property extends to its proceeds, including capital gains incident thereto, which
14Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance, 17 Tex. L.R. 121, 123, 127,
133 (1939). Community source of premiums may affect the federal estate tax, which established
its own new categories in 1942.
'6FREDERICKSON & WATSON CONSTRUCTION CO. v. BOYD, 102 P. (2d) 627,
629 (Nev. 1940); RODGERS v. SAXTON, 305 Pa. 479, 485 (1932). But 13 Vernon's Tex.
Civ. Stats. (1940), Article 4615, was impotent to enlarge the Texan constitutional definition of
the wife's separate estate.
16See FISHER v. DIEHL, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 476, 484 (1944); 13 Stand. Pa. Prac. 285.
A married woman "may not sue her husband" nor he her except in a "proceeding to protect or recover . . . separate property:" Married Women's Act, section 3, as amended March 27, 1913,
P.L. 14, 15 (48 P.S sec. 111).
17
See FULCOMER v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO., 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 264, 271272 (1940); Rule of Civil Procedure No. 2228.
183 B1. Com. *119; TIMES-DEMOCRAT PUBLISHING CO. v. MOZEE, 136 Fed. 761, 763
(C.C.A. 5th, 1905).
19BROWNFIELD v. SOUTHERN AMUSEMENT CO., 198 So. 676, 673 (La. App. 1940).
Texas, in absence of a constitutionally effective statute, has a contrary rule in death cases, not ex.
tended, however, to post.divorce weekly installments of compensation: PACIFIC INDEMNITY
CO. v. BLESSITT, 191 S.W. (2d) 904, 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
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are separate. 20 Thus, property exchanged for separate property is separate, reinvestments of separate property are separate, and borrowings on the credit of
separate property are separate property. Generally, mutations of form of the
principal of separate property are separate property so long as the separate property
can be traced. Tracing will be necessary to rebut the presumption in section three
that marital acquisitions are community property. To the extent that separate
property is in part the traceable source of a marital acquisition, in that proportion,

by a sort of separate and community tenancy in common, the new form of property
is in part separate. 21 Amazing are the ramifications of property separate by mutation. Collaterally, subject to possible reimbursement at dissolution of the com22
munity, improvements to separate property are separate property.
Fifth, operating alongside of the community property system with its proud
millenium of Spanish civil law history are the centuries old common-law-rooted
tenancies in common, joint tenancies, and tenancies by the entireties. 28 Not a
lawyer in Pennsylvania has reason to doubt the continued availability, insured ii
Oklahoma, Michigan and Oregon by express statute, of highly-favored tenancies
Z0ROSE v. HOUSTON, 11 Tex. 324, 326 (1854), "so long as it could be definitely traced."
ROSWURM v. CINCLAIR PRAIRIE OIL CO., 181 S.W. (2d) 736 (Tex. Civ. App, 1944)
error refused. On capital gains from separate property, COMMISSIONER v. SKAGGS, 122 F.
(2d) 721 (C.C,A. 5th. 1941) leaves little of an exception for the community character of gains
from separate property, such as stock in a one-man corporation, clearly resulting from a spouse's
community labor; and HARMON v. COMMISSIONER, 1 T. C. 40, 53 (1942) applied the
general rule that the capital gains on separate property are separate under the comparable earlier
Oklahoma act.
21JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. BENNETT, et al, 128 S.W. (2d) 791, 796
(Tex. Com. App. 1939), this principle having an important application as to insurance, see
BERDOLL v. BERDOLL, 145 S.W. (2d) 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
22
1t is not a rule of law that ultimately reimbursement must be made, upon final accounting;
the improver may be a volunteer or donor, or otherwise not entitled to charge the other spouse.
Nor is an interest in the land created by improvements or betterments: DAKAN v. DAKAN, 83
S.W. (2d) 620, 627 (Tex. 1935); 23 Tex. Jur. (1932) 94-95, 187-189, sees. 71, 158; McKay,
Community Property (2d ed., 1925), 659-670, sees. 1012-1024. Hence a husband's mortgagee
is not required to require the wife's joinder, from fear of improvements.
23BRADLEY v. LOVE, 60 Tex. 472, 477-478 (1883), "each having an undivided half
interest in the land as separate property;" SIBERELL v. SIBERELL, 7 P. (2d) 1003, 1004 (Cal.
1932), "all property not held as community property must, for want of a better name, be classed
as separate property;" HENDERSON v. HENDERSON, 121 P. (2d) 437, 439 (Ariz. 1942),
"notwithstanding the community property law, a husband and wife could . . . take property anJ
hold it as joint tennants with the right of survivorship . . . provided it was clear from the
deed . . and both parties understood they were doing so." Entireties significantly survived
the California Community Property Act of April 1"7, 1850, although later rendered unavailable
by the Civil Code, and McMurray, Community Property, 29 (following page 1212 in Cal. Jur.
1930 Supp.) finds "no reason to doubt . . . that a tenancy by the entirety would be created by a
conveyance to husband and wife as joint tenants prior to January 1, 1873."
Because of the simplicity of Texas land law long satisfied with "one estate, namely, an estate
in common," ROSS v. ARMSTRONG, 25 Tex. 354, 367, 371 (1860) usually blending indistinguishably with community property, BELKIN v. RAY, 176 S.W. (2d) 162, 167 (Tex. 1943),
the Texas Community Property Law (13 Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stat. arts. 4613, 4614, 4619) simply
defined "his separate property," "the separate property of the wife" and named as community
other "property acquired by either the husband or wife during marriage."
Thus a common-law cotenancy may readily co-exist with Pennsylvania's "Texan" community
property system.
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by the entireties. 24 The legislature neither had nor expressed any intention to
repeal entireties, long upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as a "desirable
method of holding property between husband and wife," and at the same session
25
it recognized entireties.
Section three
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND INCOME
FROM SEPARATE PROPERTY
Except for the foregoing classes of property expressly or impliedly separate
or non-community, all property and income acquired on and after September 1,
1947, is community property.2 This statutory formula accords community property a negative, practical definition. In Texas, as in Louisiana whence this type
of statutory formula was drawn, only separate property needed definition; most
marital property was in fact community. 27
Income from separate property of a spouse is not included as a form of
separate property in sections one and two and is therefore community property
under section three of the Pennsylvania Community Property Law of July 7,

24

Oklahoma's statute, recognizing tenancies by the entireties, perhaps for the first time, was
enacted May 7, 1945, prior to and separate from its "Texan" community property law that alone
needed to be copied in Pennsylvania. William S. Hamilton, Esq., writes on August 16, 1947, As
to the entireties act he had urged that "Our law on that feature was not settled before that en-

actment. It was of real benefit to us that this act was adopted at the same session at which the
community property law was passed." Thus Oklahoma's community property definition in its
model community preperty act left room for entireties recognized two months earlier at the same
legislative session in a separate act which Pennsylvania did not need to copy.
25MADDEN v. GOSZTONYI SAVINGS & TRUST CO., 331 Pa. 476, 483-484 (1938);
Act of May 31, 1947 (21 P.S. sec. 551).
26Still other non-community property may result from effective contractual or other provision
or from operation of conflict of laws principles. Note particularly that CASTER v. PETERSEN,

et. al., 26 P. 223, 224 (Wash. 1891) held that "money and negotiable paper bear a different
relation to the community than other property .. .the rules of the law-merchant in relation thereto have not been changed by our statute" relating to community property.
27By way of an attempt at positive definition not found in the act, community property
consists of marital gains presumptively resulting from the laboc or management of man or wife
(in Pennsylvania on and after September 1, 1947). Income from separate property is covered,
under the Texas reasoning, infra note 2, by the word "presumptively." Property acquired by re.
investment or other mutation of community property is, at least indirectly, property "resulting"
from marital industry that produced the original community property. Since the act treats joint
gifts as non-community on their face, this tentative definition escapes the further complications
in de Funiak, Principles of Community Property (1943) 225-226, sec. 82.
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1947.28 This logical construction of the act has been authoritatively made, without
hesitation, in Oklahoma. 2 ' The act, in section four, gives the husband the control
of all income from his separate property, and specifically provides that:
"The wife shall have the management and control and may dispose
of . . .that portion of the . .. community property consisting
of . . .all rents, interest, dividends, and other income from her

separate property . . ."
While the act in section four in terms recognizes as community property "all
.. . income from .. . separate property" it might be given a prospective con-

struction to such an extent as to exclude from the community income from separate
property where the separate property was "already in existence" on September 1,
1947.80 Whether, in line with the purposes of the act, such a distinction need
28As under the Spanish law, "rents of separate property in Texas of both spouses have
always been community property:" COMMISSIONER v. SKAGGS, 122 F. (2d) 721, cert. den.
315 U.S. 811 (1942); 23 Tex. Jur. 119-127, secs. 97, 98, 102, 103; 11 Am. Jur. 194-196, sems.
32, 33; 41 C.J.S. 1013-1018, sec. 479. Texas, at a time when the husband had the management
of his wife's separate estate, reasoned, and established irrespective of the reason, in DE BLANE
v. LYNCH & CO., 23 Tex. 25, 29 (1859) that "the law presumes that the husband's skill or
care contributed to its production; or that he, in some other way contributed to the common
acquisition." Similarily, in neighboring Louisiana, TRORLIGHT v. COLLECTOR OF REVENUE,
25 S. (2d) 547, 551 (La. App. 1946) reasoned that "in providing that the fruits of the wife's
separate property, administered by the husband, should fall into the community, the framers of
the Code realized that those fruits were the result to some extent, of the husband's efforts and
that therefore he, as one of the partners in the community should be allowed to benefit by his
efforts." The rule is indubitably sound, fair and avoids difficulties as to income from the separate
property of a spouse in cofinection with which that spouse works: 3 Vernier, American Family
Laws 212 (1935). The rule has been appropriately modified in section four by giving control
of the income therefrom to the spouse owning the separate estate.
2HARMON v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION, 1i8 P. (2d) 205, 209 (1941) under
the 1939 elective act,indistinguishable in this respect from the 1945 mandatory act copied in
. ., the
Pennsylvania, held, in the fewest possible words, that "The income d6rived from
separate real property of the appellant . . . is property acquired 'after the effective date of
the election to come under the terms of the Act,' and therefore is 'deemed the community or
common property of the husband and the wife.'" Again, in COMMISSIONER v. HARMON,
323 U.S. 44, 45 (1944) Mr. Justice Roberts, today the leader- of the Pennsylvania Bar, instantly
recognized as to "dividends from his stocks, dividends from her stocks" and "interest on
obligations due him" that "The Act constitutes all of these receipts community income."
80COM. ex rel. GREENAWALT v. GREENAWALT, 347 Pa. 510, 513 (1943), but that
decision as to principal, may yield in this connection to EVERHAR'P v. EVERHART, 87 Pa.
Superior Ct. 184, 190 (1926) holding support legislation may "apply to income thereafter
accruing from trusts previously created." As a reductio ad. absurdum, couldn't property incidents
in such income be changed,, ever, through all its mutations?
Whether income from future or all separate property of husband or wife is community is an
entirely separable feature of the act, and Michigan, with California and most of the older comstates, adopted entirely workable community property systems without this
munity property
feature. As between living spouses, the act is practically unassailable constitutionally, because
the owner of the separate property controls the income therefrom, rendering applicable LEWIS
v. LEWIS, 18 Cal. 654, 659 (1861) rather than GEORGE v. RANSOM, 15 Cal. 322, 323, 324
(1860). See YESLER v. HOCHSTETTLER, 30 P. 398, 400 (Wash. 1892). The Commonwealth
has broad power to control and regulate both the relation of; husband and wife, and the property
rights directly connected with it, NEILSON, et al.v. KILGORE, 145 U.S. 487, 12 S. Ct. 943, 944
(1892), including property rights arising independently of marriage which require change
because of public considerations arising from the marriage relation.
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not be drawn may soon be settled by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as it has
been by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 8'
In addition to its statutory formula, section three also features two presumptions that powerfully favcr community property.
A first, ancient presumption is that an acquisition by man or wife after
September 1, 1947, is community property of both though title be taken in the
name of one. This presumption can be rebutted by proof by a preponderance of
the evidence that the property in question is, or is clearly traceable through mutation of form to, property in one of the excepted categories in sections one or two
of separate or non-community property.82
Section three adds a second presumption, on death, or divorce, as to "effects"
that traces through Texas back to the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, and 1808. 83
This second presumption is that-all property possessed at dissolution of the marital community must have been acquired during marriage, after September 1, 1947,
and hence under the first presumption must be community property.
While these presumptions will fit nicely many couples modestly and happily
situated, free from the records with which the experts would confound us, these
presumptions will lead some, who deem it important to maintain and some day
to prove the separate character of property through all its mutations, to make an
initial inventory as of September 1 or later wedding day and periodic inventories,
signed by both spouses, to keep careful continuous records, as of income and investments, and to segregate separate property, as in separate safety deposit boxes or
separate bank accounts, from income therefrom or from other community property,
to avoid commingling and facilitate tracing-all for the sake of eventual rebuttal of

SIMARK WILCOX, JR. v. THE PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, supra
note 2 is pending on original jurisdiction before the Supreme Court, No. 1490 Miscellaneous
Docket Eastern District.
If such distinction were drawn, spouses desiring to ensure the
community nature of income from separate property owned or claimed prior to September 1,
1947, would simply take the necessary steps, where feasible, to reacquire the separate property,
as separate property to which the act though thus construed must apply. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue has held that the statute is effective for federal income tax purposes both
in its application to earnings and also to income from separate property: see Philadelphia Legal
Intelligencer for November 6, 1947, p. 1.
820f course it may be shown that the property is not community and is outside the statutory
formula for contractual or other reasons. Even where a party under the law of pleading and
evidence has the burden of proving that property is community, for example where the husband
sues the wife's incautious pledgee of community property under the husband's management, a
diamond ring in a Texas case, proof that the property was acquired during marriage, after
September 1, 1947, makes a prima facie case that such property is community.
aaother terms in section three, such as "possess" and "satisfactorily" likewise originated
in Louisiana: see Dart, Louisiana Civil Code (2d ed.) article 2405 and historical note. Whether
or not it derives from French parlance, the word "effects" applies broadly to property and to real
property: McKINNEY v. NUNN, 17 S.W. 516, 518, note 2 (Tex. 1891).
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the community presumptions.8 4 Just what is advisable requires careful analysis of
each couple's and spouse's particular situation, including any potential federal estate
taxes.
Of the common property of the conjugal community the spouses as partners
are beneficial co-owners. Ownership, in section three however, must be distinguished from management in section four.85 With this qualification, the legislature has seen fit in section three to spell out that each spouse is "vested with an
undivided one-half interest" in community property. 36
Sections four and five
MANAGEMENT OR DISPOSITION
Where third persons might be adversely affected by conjugal co-ownership,
the legislature has carefully shaped community property more in the likeness of
common law property with a definite title.
Section four makes a practical division of the management of community
property, in the main based upon its title.2 7 Except as limited by section five, it
gives the wife the management, control and power to dispose of her earnings, of
income from her separate property, and of "community property the title to which
stands in her name." The husband with respect to all other community property,
34The model Oklahoma act made "no provision for an inventory or listing of the separately
owned properties by the husband or the wife . . . criticism was it made public property separately
owned ... available to unscrupulous solicitors or salesmen." McKenzie. Community Property
as it Affects Titles, 16 Okla. B. A. J. 973 (6/30/45); Daggett, The Oklahoma Community

Property Act, 2 La. L.R. 575, 580 (1940) suggests a private "inventory . . . in after years
would greatly facilitate a settlement between spouses or heirs . . . in Louisiana . . . has proved
to be a very practical aid."
SSReading section three in connection with sections four and eleven to fourteen, the courts
of quarter sessions in nonsupport cases are not required to award every wife one-half of a husband's
earnings. Half his salary was held "too much" for her in HOLLAND v. HOLLAND, 247 P.
455, 456 (Wash. 1926). Upon abandonment and nonsupport, the court of common pleas may
substitute her for him as community property manager, and spender.
3
GAn analogous provision had more justification in 1927 in California where the husband
had been styled sole owner of community property. Perhaps the legislature in Pennsylvania as
in Oklahoma was afraid Uncle Sam wouldn't read the applicable Texas decisions that for over
a century, as a natural incident to basic conjugal partnership theory, have recognized that "in
Texas the wife is a full equal co-owner with her husband of the community partnership assets:"
ROMPEL v. UNITED STATES, 59 F. Supp. 483, 487 (1945) and cases cited.
3t
' Section four speaks of "management% control, disposition" and disposition to outsiders
merits chief emphasis at this time. Management and control, beyond mandatory to abjectly
humble domestic suggestions, will have judicial significance chiefly in dealings with outsiders,
the making of contracts which subject community property claims of outsiders, and in the prosecution and defense of actions. Under Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure No. 2002, as construed by
the Supreme Court and in HOPKINS v. BAILEY, 52 Dauphin 140, 142 (1942), "The real party
in interest of a given chose in action is the person who can discharge it and can control in
action brought to enforce it." Note also Rule 2002 (c) and Jacob, The Law of Community
Property in Idaho (1943) 78, 83. In l'rexas and generally for years the husband, as statutory
manager of the community property, was the person to sue in actions arising in reference to it.
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for example where the title stands in his name, bears a similar managerial resemblance to an owner, pre-commnunity style."
The title-holding husband, as managing partner, can himself mortgage as
heretofore. 9 He can also convey or contract to convey property indubitably community (since community property knows no dower) without his wife's joinder,
the proceeds becoming community property. 40 The manager of community propcrty, typically the husband, can even give it away, without asking leave as required
by California statute and Washington case law, barring any disposition made
with intent to defraud his wife. 41 Once the insurance companies, which got ants
in their pants from an occidental Washington case, recognize the broad powers
of the managing spouse under the act, the act's supposed interference with insurance if premiums have a community source will largely vanish into thin air.' 2
It has been definitely settled in Texas that, ".. . where there
is no intention on the part of the husband to defraud the wife, the
proceeds of a policy on the life of a husband vest in the beneficiary
named in the policy upon the death of the insured, even though
the policy was taken out by the husband durin' - coverture and the
premiums were paid out ot community funds.

43

8SHere's another statutory formula, defining what the wife manages, and passing the
management of all the rest to the husband. Historically, the husband was the general manager,
so this is rather a back-hand way of saying he is the manager, but here's an exception, putting
the exception before the horse. In Pennsylvania marital property in both names is almost invariably held in a tenancy by the entirety, which is not communitY property; but if community
property is in both names, the husband is manager:' YOUNG v. ARKANSAS-LOUISIANA GAS
CO., 166 So. 139 (La. 1936). He may invest her with his authority: THOMAS v. CHANCE,
•11 Tex. 634, 637-638 (1854).
89CANCILLA v. BONDY, 353 Pa. 249, 255 (1945); McKINNEY v. NUNN, 17 S.W.
516, 518 (1891); JORDAN v. IMTHURN, 51 Tex. 276, 287 (1879), "The power of general
disposition over the community, given by statute, would contain the lesser power to incumber it."
40BELL v. CRABi, 244 S.W. 371, 372 (Tex. Com. App. 1922); DAVI9 v. DUNCAN,
102 S.W. (2d) 287, 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), error dismissed; HOPKINS v. ROBERTSON,
138 S.W. (2d) 310, 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), error refused, law library sold to stenographer;
Trice, Conveyances under the Community Property Act, 16 Okla. B.A.J. 1435, 1436, 1438
(10/27/45). If the property is separate , then the wife must join in a deed, unlike a
mortgage, while dower continues in separate property, but there is no dower in community
property, as shown in the last four footnotes to section 15 infra, Ballinger, Property Rights of
Husband and Wife, Under the Community or Ganancial System (1895), 37, 123, 276-277, secs.
10, 83, 218; 3 Vernier, American Family Laws (1935) 351, sec. 189.
41MOODY v. SMOOT, 14 S.W. 28), 286 (1890). The Texas cases actually finding fraud
are pretty carefully limited to impending divorce, AARON v. AARON, 173 SW. (2d) 310, 314
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943), error refuse4, or "another woman," WATSON v. HARRIS, 130 S.W.
237, 4241
(Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
2
See application of community property system to problems arising in connection with life
insurance policies, 114 A.L.R. 545 (1938), 168 A.L.R. 342 347 (1947). But divorce (see
discussion under section 10, infra) raises problems, as it terminates managerial power, as does
death of the other spouse, although it has been happily held that "the insured, had the right
after the death of his wife to change the beneficiaries in the policies as authorized by the terms
of the policies, and upon his death the proceeds of the policies became the exclusive property
of the beneficiaries named therein at that time:" VOLUNTEER STATE LIFE INS. CO., et al.
v. HARDIN,
197 S.W. (2d) 105, 107 (Tex. 1946).
43 VOLUNTEER STATE LIFE INS. CO., et al.v. HARDIN, 197 S.W. (2d) 105, 106
(Tex. 1946), 168 A.L.R. 337, 340-341; cf. COE v. WINCHESTER, 33 P. (2d) 286, 287-289
(Ariz. 1934), partnership insurance.
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Section five makes sure, however, that a mere wife cannot convey real estate,
as titleholder, without her master's signature. It prescribes, generally, the"manner
provided" by "prior" Pennsylvania law where any property, separate or community, shall be "sold, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of." The common-law
incapacity of the wife has by successive statutes been entirely eliminated in Pennsylvania except that "she may not execute or acknowledge a deed, or other written
instrument, conveying her real property, unless her husband join in such conveyance." 44
Much may be done by conveyancers now to minimize future difficulties for
title searchers"5 by recording in instruments relating to real estate relevant facts
in regard to the marital status, from time of acquisition after September 1, 1947,
to the time of conveyance, of parties of the first part.
The benificial interest of a community co-owner, unlike dower, does not terminate if she predeceases him, or upon divorce. Therefore vast import attaches to
the recognition, in the carefully chosen language of section four, that the "title"'
(meticuously distinguished from vested beneficial Co-ownership) of the whole
"community property" can be limited to one spouse as grantee. Bona fide purchasers, here as in Texas under the so-called "trust" theory incident to the Texas
"partners' double ownership" theory, may rely on the record title in a man or
woman (sans husband at time she conveys), in the absence of notice of a spouse
in being at the time record title had been conveyed to such individual.4B Notwithstanding community property, men can still have marketable titles.

44

By Act of April 11, 1947, P.L. (see 48 P.S. sec. 32) it is added that the joinder of the
by the wife acting as attorney-in-fact for her
husband in such conveyance may be. inter ilia,
husband under a power of attorney duly executed by him. It may be expedient for several reasons
to request the husband's joinder in her mortgage and bond. His joinder in her mortgage was
required by statute prior to the amendment of May 17, 1945, P.L. 625, which still requires his
joinder in her deed, as above quoted.
45
Martin, Community Property from the Point of View of a Practical Title Examiner, 17
Proceedings of the Idaho State Bar (1941), 118. 120; Everest. et al., Necessary Showing of
Facts in Conveyances of Real Estate under Oklahoma Community Property Law, 16 Okla. B. A.
J. (9/29/45) 1263, 1266.
46"The policy of our laws is to protect purchasers against secret titles, whether they be
legal or equitable," EDWARDS v. BROWN, 4 S.W. 380, 5 S.W. 87, 89, 90 (Tex. 1887),
wife; PATrY
bona fide purchaser from second wife as devisee of H prevailed over divorced first
v. MIDDLETON, 17 S.W. 909, 911-912, 913 (Tex. 1891), H conveyed" after W died; GRIGGS

v. HOUSTON OIL CO., 213 S.W. 261. 263 (Tex. Coin. App. 1919

where E.O.G. had a

common law husband living when she acquired but not when she conveyed title, and she signed
a recorded intermediate power of attorney as Mrs. E.O.G., "There must be something on the
face of the title papers to indicate the existence of the marriage relation at the time the title is
acquired in order to give notice of the community interest;" Olds, Bona, Fide Purchaser Doctrine
Should Be Applied to Community Property Dissolutions, 16 Okla. B.A.J. 1843, 1845-1846
(12/29/45); cp. 3 Vernier, American Family Laws (1935)

220-221.
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Section six
BANK DEPOSITS
Funds on deposit in the name of one spouse in any banking institution
are, during marriage, presumptively that spouse's separate property.' 7 Checks
and orders of that spouse against the account shall be honored by the bank unless
48
it is notified that the funds are not the separate property of that spouse.
Section six is a hand-me-down from an identical 1913 Texas statute passed
to make it safe for banks to honor checks on her account signed by a wife t,1
40
parlous times when men controlled even the separate property of their wives.
It is a rebuttable presumption applying not only between the parties and those
claiming under them, but to creditors as well.5 0 The presumption may not
follow funds derived from bank account into real estate or other property purchased therewith. 51
The management-following-title provision of general application and later
Oklahoma vintage in section four should enable banks and building and loan
associations to deal in good faith with a spouse in whose name the account or
chose in action stands, as at most community property subject to the management
52
and disposition of such spouse.

Section six is limited to "funds on deposit in any . . .banking institution
. . .in the name of the husband or wife," and has no application to an account
47This presumption created by section six is defunct upon death or divorce and the presumption in favor of community property in section three prevails: WINTERS, et al. v. DUNCAN,
220 S.W. 219, 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
48 Section 905 of the Banking Code of May 15, 1933, P.L. 624 (7 P.S. sec. 819-905)
protects a banking institution in making paymev:t to the person to whose credit a deposit stands
on its books unless an "adverse claimant" in addition.to giving notice "shall also procure either
an attachment or a proper restraining order . . ."
'913 Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stats. Ann. (1940) art. 4622s p. 596; 8 Tex. L.R. 398, 403
(Note, 1930), "Prior to the passage of this provision in 1913 . . . the bank, had to honor
checks drawn by the husband . . . upon . . . the separate property of the wife . . ."

5023 Tex. Jut. 96, sec. 73, also 142, sec. 113, and 153, sec. 122, "The statute of presumptions
with reference to accounts in bank probably does not affect the right of control if the account
belongs to the communnity . . .
5
'CALLAWAY., et al. v. CLARK, et al., 200 S.W. (2d). 447, 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947t,
"Manifestly this statutory presumption was meant for the guidance of the bank in its dealings
with the deposit or account of the spouse in whose name it is and was also meant to apply to
dealings of creditors generally with the spouse in whose name it is. It was never meant to
supplant, even as to such deposit itself, the general presumption of community estate above
discussed-"
82 See Hamilton, Oklahoma Community Property Law as it Affects Operation and Management of Savings and Loan Associations, 16 Okla. B.A.J. 1077, 1082 (6/30/45). Michigan's
section 16 and Oregon's section 14 added statutory protection for insurance companies making
payment, in absence of written notice to the contrary, in accordance with the terms of an insurance
contract, declaratory of BLETHEM v. PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF CAL., 243 P.
431, 435-436 (Cal. 1926).
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in the names of both husband and wife. Such joint accounts in Pennsylvania have
long been treated as tenancies by the entireties.

Sections seven and eight
CREDITORS
The act continues from section four its common law emphasis, as to third
persons, upon title to community property. For debts, contracted by either spouse,
creditors may proceed as heretofore, treating the spouse with title as if owner.
The liability also of the separate property of the contracting spouse is patent. 5'
Creditors, of whom community property legislation elsewhere is prone to say
little, are specifically accorded rights best understood in the light of basic Texan
provisions that
"The community property of the husband and wife shall be liable
marriage, except in such cases as
for their debts contracted during
55
are specially excepted by law."
This basic Texan provision was adapted and limited in two respects in 1939 and
1945 by Oklahoma legislation that supplied Pennsylvania its sections seven and
eight.
First, as to debts contracted by the wife, only that portion of the community
property which stands in her name or is otherwise placed under her management
by section four shall be liable. For debts contracted by the husband, that portion
of the community property under his management, for example where he has
title, shall be liable. Such liabilities are exclusive, section eight emphasizes. Thus
the husband can, when not acting in fraud of creditors, place community property
in his wife's name; while both spouses live, the family has an anchor to windward
against his business reverses or unwise endorsements. Also, matrimony is not
U8MADDEN v. GOSZTONYI SAVINGS AND TRUST CO., 331 Pa. 476 (1938). The
usual form of deposit agreement, signed by both spouses, expressly creates a tenancy by the
entireties, payable to the survivor and continues effective: see In re IVERS ESTATE, 104 P. (2d)
467, 471 (Wash. 1940); CONNEALLY v. SAN FRANCISCO SAV. & LOAN SOC., 232 P.
755 (Cal. App. 1921), "payable to either or to the survivor of them; " Lowry and Robert, The
Oregon Community Property Law (July, 1947) 17, "The community property law would not
appear to alter the rights of a husband and wife in joint bank accounts."
54MOODY v. SMOOT, 14 S.W. 285, 286 (Tex. 1890), "All debts contracted by him he
is liable to pay, not only from the community estate, but also from his separate property, and is
subject to be sued therefori. . ." The concluding proviso in section eight is that "the husband
or wife, on paying community debts, shall as between themselves, charge the same against community property."
5513 Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stats. Ann. (1940) art. 4620, p. 590. The liability extended to
separate, ante-nuptial debts: PORTIS v. PARKER, 22 Tex. 699 (1859); TAYLOR v. MURPHY,
50 Tex. 291, 295, 300-302 (1878); CRIM v. AUSTIN, 6 S. W.(2d) 348, 349 (Tex. Corn. App.
1928), "there is no question but that the community property generally was liable for the
auternptial debts of the wife."
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an act of bankruptcy, but a just solution is offered for ante-nuptial debts; each
has protection against ante-nuptial debts of the other. So far, so good.
Second, as to torts, the act similarly restricts liability while both do live to that
portion of the community property managed by the spouse who caused the damage.
As to torts, the act is complicated by a further restriction of liability, not appearing
in the original Oklahoma act of 1939 and inserted in the 1945 act just to make
sure it qualified the wife sufficiently as an owner to justify her in reporting half of
the community income as income "of" the wife. This novel additional restriction is
not precisely the family-car doctrine. Nor does it adopt the Washington "entityagency" theory that there can be no recovery against the community unless the
damage-wreaking spouse was engaged in doing something which could be said
to be beneficial to his principal, the marital community. Section seven provides
that such community property as the wife manages is liable for torts of the wife
solely when committed in the course of acquiring, holding, or managing "such"
community property. Such community property as the husband manages is liable
for torts of the husband solely when committed in the course of acquiring, managing, holding "or disposing of the" community property. That's all. As a result,
ante-nuptial torts are out along with many torts not belonging to this propertied
class. Louisiana cases may help our courts construe this community-propertymanagement limitation within a limitation of tort liability. Going beyond all this,
a tenancy by the entireties may well still be preferred by Pennsylvania spouses, for a
chance of total absolution of the property,-if the tort-feasor dies first-and for
a surer haven from tort liability while both do live.
Now, for all debts contracted by the spouse holding title thereto, such community property is liable. The limitation within a limitation as to course of management of community property applies only to torts, and not to debts."6 American community property law generally refuses to make community property a

6BKnowing the history and purpose of the community-property-management-tort proviso added
in tax-conscious Oklahoma in 1945 to a previously plain adoption of Texas law itself sufficient
tax-wise. Latta and Gemmill, Observations on Some Pennsylvania Community Property Problems,
96 U. of P. L.R. 20, 36-39 (Nov. 1947) conclude that "all debts contracted by a spouse may be
collected out of community property under the control of that spouse or standing in that spouse's
name . .." As in the 1945 Oklahoma act, section seven makes "community property . . . in
her name ...liable for debts contracted by the wife and for torts of the wife committed in the
course of acquiring, holding or managing such community property" whereas the 1939 act merely
made "'community property, record title to which is in her name .. .subject to debts contracted
by the wife arising out of tort, or otherwise . . Again debts contracted in the course of dis.
posing of "her" community property ("disposing" appears only as to him) would be out in the
cold, otherwise. A "course of ...community property" limitation would be awful for community creditors who render personal services, as do beauticians, who provide hotel accomodations,
or who do countless deeds not tied for marital property.
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castle in Spain about which separate creditors can only dream-till a spouse dies.8
The act indeed does not offer the alternative, assumed by some, of adopting Washington's semi-Spanish distinction between separate and community creditors, for
the wording of section seven is explicitly a "course of ... community property"
limitation. If this statutory tort limitation were applicable to debts, it would bar
from community property innumerable truly community creditors who render twentieth century personal services not related in any sense to community property.

The concluding presumption in section seven, that debts after September 1,
1947, are community debts is found in the case law of Texas, Louisiana and other
community property jurisdictions that do not bar separate creditors from community property; this presumption was not found in the Washington statutes and
was first reduced to statutory form, in the states, in Oklahoma.58 It is very plain

that all debts created by either spouse prior to September 1, 1947, are separate
debts. It cannot be that the legislature intended to exclude all existing creditors
as separate creditors from all future community property earnings of the debtorspouse. The community property act is not a bankruptcy act.

Practically, therefore, section seven should enable creditors to treat the spouse
with title to community property as if owner in determining liability for "debts contracted by the wife" or for "debts contracted by the husband." Following its title,
57"It is generally held that community property is liable for the separate debts, obligations,
and liabilities of the husband:" HOLT v. EMPEY, 178 P. 703 (Ida. 1919). See DAVIS v.
COMPTON, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858) ; PORTIS v. PARKER, 22 Tex. 699, 701-3, 705-6 (1859);
VAN MAREN v. JOHNSON, 15 Cal. 308 (1860); McKay, Community Property (2d ed., 1925)
528-535, secs. 793-799. McKay (at page 534) commends the "reasoning of the Supreme Court
of Texas, and the practical justice of the rule adopted in California, Louisiana and Texas."
A contrary rule in Arizona and Washington has some statutory basis: "The community
property of the husband and wife shall be liable for the community debts," Ariz. Code Ann,
(1939) sec. 63-304; "he shall not .. , encumber, the community real estate, unless the wife
join . . . Provided . . . community real estate shall be subject to . . . liens of judgments recovered for community debts." Rem. Rev. Stat. (1932). sec. 6893. A Washington judge, Ballinger,
Property Rights of Husband and Wife under the Community or Ganancial 'System (1895) 197,
196, secs. 147, 146, trenchantly criticized this "rule of the statute" exempting community realty
and as to personalty declared that "In Washington . . . unquestionably his separate debts, both
antenuptial and nuptial, may, during coverture, be satisfied out of the common property; . . .!
Unfortunately a hard case made bad law (torts and debts not then being distinguished), in
SCHRAMM v. STEELE, 166 P. 634 (Wash. 1917) where it was sought to hold community
personalty for a judgement obtained against the husband for alienating the affections of another
man's wife, and the statutory rule was first extended to personalty.
It would do little discernible good to impose the contrary rule later regretted in Washington,
Mechem, Creditors' Rights in Community Property, 11 Wash. L.R. 80, 87, 90 (1936), there
making a difference only for suretyship cases where Washington is inching our way and for antenuptial debts where our statute in effect gives to each his own. For such cold pottage shall we
.sell an authoritative and statutory birthright of certainty and practiral justice?
68 1n Dodd, Community Property in Pennsylvania, 52 Dickinson L.R. 24, 34 (Oct. 1947)
"great importance is attached to the rebuttable presumption that all debts created by either
after marriage and after the effective date of the act are community debts" in raising the possibility that "The statue is ambiguous as to whether community property shall be liable for individual
or separate debts 'contracted' by the husband or wife." The presumption is most important on
dissolution of the community when Oklahoma's innovation of title-determined-management.responsibility fades out of the picture.
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community property should not in Pennsylvania, unlike Washington, much disturb existing bankruptcy practice.65 It would not be amiss, however, to secure the
signatures of both spouses to any evidence of indebtedness; their separate and
non-community property is the principal security man and wife can presently
offer. 6 0
Section eight further develops the important modification of Spanish theory
that in Pennsylvania creditors follow the "title" to property of an undissolved
community. No creditor of the husband shall have recourse, for payment of debts
or liabilities created by him to that portion of the community property under the
wife's management or in the name of the wife; conversely that's the only portion
her creditors can reach. It is otherwise at dissolution of the community, when "all
debts of the community" created by either spouse are payable, in the broader
language of Section 15, "out of the community property" irrespective of which
spouse had title.61
Thus, in eight short sections the Pennsylvania legislature, almost overnight,
adopted a very practical, in time far-reaching community property law for certain
future acquisitions of man and wife, with the minimum possible disturbances of
62
existing Keystone customs.

59

See de Funiak, Principles of Community Property (1943)
502, sec. 178 passim, Moore,
The Community Property System and the Economic Reconstruction of the Family Unit: Insolvency and Bankruptcy, 11 Washington L.R. 61 (1936). Cf. HORNSBY v. HORNSBY, 93
S.W. (2d) 379, 381 (Tex. 1936); CULLUM v. LOWE, 9 S.W. (2d) 70, 71, 72 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928).
0Rankin, Pennsylvania Community Property Law (Weekly Reporter, Chester, Pa., Aug. 20,

1947), suggests that in securing maximum protection for a creditor on a bond, note or other
evidence of indebtedness, both spouses be joined jointly and severally as obligors, binding community
property with specific provision that all property in which either or both obligors have any
interest or ownership in any capacity, as separate property, tenancy by the entireties, joint
property or community property irrespective of its title shall be responsible for payment of the
obligation and any judgment thereon- also the creditor or holder of the obligation should be
conferred the express right to proceed against any of such property with the right to elect the
order in which to proceed to collect.
61Because bne spouse's title to community property entitled that spouse's creditors thereto,
section eight thoughtfully adds an inter-spousal fraudulent conveyance clause, dispensing with
proof of reliance on such community property. So long as the spouse incurring the indebtedness
'or liability had title at the time of incurring indebtedness or liability, the creditor's grasp of the
property is not eluded by a subsequent transfer to the other spouse. Section nine gives this
additional significance.
62
Section nine permits readjustments to meet exceptional circumstances, and the remainder
of the act contains an epilogue tor broken homes, concerning divorce% abandonment or incapicit',
and death. Though brief, these eight sections are plain in the light of a century of judicial
interpretation of such legislation in Texas, As is true generally, Pound. The Spirit of the Common Law
(1921) 174, "the traditional element of the legal system is and must be used, even in an age
of copious legislation, to supplement, round out and develop the enacted element . . ." The
legislature had a right to rely---PLAINVIEW FIRST NAT. BANK v. McWHORTER, 179 S.W.
1147, 1149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915)--on "the settled channels of the law, dug deep by successive
interpretations beretiodre made . . ."

